I mean, if you see the clonation from a materialistic point of view, and you presume there is not a conscience (let's call like this the thing that feels) independent from the brain, because a materialistic pov presumes that everithing is generated by the brain. Then, if you clone a person you are also cloning (aka making a copy) of that concience, so you have two distinct things that feel pain, and it's impossible that the cloned person feels the pain of his clone and viceversa.
Yes, but the point of the example is: which one is you? From a materialistic perspective, since they are exactly identical, particle by particle, then both should be you. If not, which one is you? Why would it be the original and not the copy? The copy is identical to the original; there is absolutely no difference.
So if you adopt a purely materialistic perspective, then, in theory, you should be both, and you should experience both. But that does not make sense, because it would also imply that there is some kind of higher entity capable of experiencing both.
From a materialistic perspective “you” is generated by the brain. Two different brains (even if exact copies) two different “you”. The two brains are not connected in any way, so from a materialistic point of view, it completely makes sense that you are not both.
You remain yourself in your own brain, while the copy has its own, making it a different person. This is from a purely materialistic perspective—one that I don't fully share, but there it is.
From a materialistic perspective, there is nothing “in” your brain—you are your brain. If both brains are identical, then they are the same in every physical respect. If you claim that you are something within the brain that is non-material, then you have already moved away from materialism.
The copy is exactly the same, particle by particle, so how could it be a different person if it is the same brain, and you are the brain?
I think one has to be careful not to force themselves or try to reach a point where they pretend to have no beliefs, because this is very unrealistic. If you put a cake in the fridge, close the door, and then reopen it after one minute, you expect the cake to still be there. That is a belief. Do you really not have that belief, or are you just pretending not to have it?
Regarding existence itself, this is a well-established idea in philosophy. The line of reasoning is the following: if I am wondering whether something exists or not, then something must exist, because if nothing existed, I could not wonder whether something exists or not. One could argue that this is self-referential, but it still leads to a real conclusion.
I do not believe that enlightenment means having removed every possible story. I still discover new stories almost every day. I like the metaphor of language: being fluent represents enlightenment, and the words represent stories. You could say that you are enlightened when you become fluent, but you may still learn new words. Of course, if you can barely say a word, then you are not fluent. It is also important not to tell yourself the story that you no longer have any stories, because that is, in itself, a story.
You make a good point: it is very important, when you dismantle a story, not to replace it with another one. The idea is not to switch from believing in Santa Claus to some other kind of fairy, but to realize that Santa Claus does not exist because it does not make sense.
I think the closest we can come to defining identity is “thing that ultimately feels.” Even if everything were a dream or a simulation, it would still require a dreamer. Of course, we do not know the nature of this dreamer, but it does not really matter. Something must exist that has the capacity to feel, otherwise we would not be feeling anything, whatever the nature of experience may be.
You're right, that is a decent conclusion. We are something that feels. I like it. Although we could argue, what is aware of something that feels? Are we the awareness of the body that feels?
I made a mistake about the feeling part. I wrote from assumptions which i think i saw when reading your post. So my text crosswired with these thoughts which you cannot know of course. Sorry about that, my bad.
Because a common trap on this path is thinking feeling is life and that without feeling this or that we dont live anymore. It's inherent with our fear of death on a feeling level. Feeling (the ego/self) is watch make us experience life and gives life meaning and letting go of these feelings would result in emptiness where life has no meaning which nobody then wants of course. It just would feel like death.
In my defense, your other posts did confirm my intuition. But of course that doesnt excuse the mistake i made in my previous post. My apologies.
I think the closest thing to identity would be identification with “thing that ultimately feels.” I am not saying this is some kind of perfect or ultimate truth, but it is the closest we can get. I use “feeling” in a very broad sense, including awareness under that umbrella.
We have no idea what we ultimately are, but if we really have to be something, it is probably “thing that ultimately feels/is aware.” If you try to introduce something that is aware of “thing that ultimately feels,” you are just shifting the problem, and now you would be the thing that is aware of that—but this does not really make sense.
It is simpler to group feeling and awareness together and say that we are “thing that ultimately feels.” The key word here is “ultimately.”
Muy Interesante
I don't agree with the example of clone.
I mean, if you see the clonation from a materialistic point of view, and you presume there is not a conscience (let's call like this the thing that feels) independent from the brain, because a materialistic pov presumes that everithing is generated by the brain. Then, if you clone a person you are also cloning (aka making a copy) of that concience, so you have two distinct things that feel pain, and it's impossible that the cloned person feels the pain of his clone and viceversa.
Yes, but the point of the example is: which one is you? From a materialistic perspective, since they are exactly identical, particle by particle, then both should be you. If not, which one is you? Why would it be the original and not the copy? The copy is identical to the original; there is absolutely no difference.
So if you adopt a purely materialistic perspective, then, in theory, you should be both, and you should experience both. But that does not make sense, because it would also imply that there is some kind of higher entity capable of experiencing both.
From a materialistic perspective “you” is generated by the brain. Two different brains (even if exact copies) two different “you”. The two brains are not connected in any way, so from a materialistic point of view, it completely makes sense that you are not both.
So which one you are? The original or the copy? Keep in mind they are identical
You remain yourself in your own brain, while the copy has its own, making it a different person. This is from a purely materialistic perspective—one that I don't fully share, but there it is.
From a materialistic perspective, there is nothing “in” your brain—you are your brain. If both brains are identical, then they are the same in every physical respect. If you claim that you are something within the brain that is non-material, then you have already moved away from materialism.
The copy is exactly the same, particle by particle, so how could it be a different person if it is the same brain, and you are the brain?
You are right, "From a materialistic perspective, there is nothing “in” your brain—you are your brain".
Two brains, two you, it's easy man!
So many beliefs and idea's about who we are and about reality :-)
How do you know that these new beliefs and idea's are not distorting your view of reality anymore compared to your old believes and idea's?
How can you tell you're not still lying to yourself?
For example you say that "us" is unknowable but at the same time stating it is the "something" that feels.
Which is a real rationale answer to the question: Who are we without our stories? haha
Then we are that what feels :-)
So rationale, but still lying to yourself. You can go even deeper than that if you want to, of course. That is just a choice you can make, or not ;-)
You can either believe you're already enlightent, or look even further for the truth of these believes you have now.
I think one has to be careful not to force themselves or try to reach a point where they pretend to have no beliefs, because this is very unrealistic. If you put a cake in the fridge, close the door, and then reopen it after one minute, you expect the cake to still be there. That is a belief. Do you really not have that belief, or are you just pretending not to have it?
Regarding existence itself, this is a well-established idea in philosophy. The line of reasoning is the following: if I am wondering whether something exists or not, then something must exist, because if nothing existed, I could not wonder whether something exists or not. One could argue that this is self-referential, but it still leads to a real conclusion.
I do not believe that enlightenment means having removed every possible story. I still discover new stories almost every day. I like the metaphor of language: being fluent represents enlightenment, and the words represent stories. You could say that you are enlightened when you become fluent, but you may still learn new words. Of course, if you can barely say a word, then you are not fluent. It is also important not to tell yourself the story that you no longer have any stories, because that is, in itself, a story.
You make a good point: it is very important, when you dismantle a story, not to replace it with another one. The idea is not to switch from believing in Santa Claus to some other kind of fairy, but to realize that Santa Claus does not exist because it does not make sense.
I think the closest we can come to defining identity is “thing that ultimately feels.” Even if everything were a dream or a simulation, it would still require a dreamer. Of course, we do not know the nature of this dreamer, but it does not really matter. Something must exist that has the capacity to feel, otherwise we would not be feeling anything, whatever the nature of experience may be.
You're right, that is a decent conclusion. We are something that feels. I like it. Although we could argue, what is aware of something that feels? Are we the awareness of the body that feels?
I made a mistake about the feeling part. I wrote from assumptions which i think i saw when reading your post. So my text crosswired with these thoughts which you cannot know of course. Sorry about that, my bad.
Because a common trap on this path is thinking feeling is life and that without feeling this or that we dont live anymore. It's inherent with our fear of death on a feeling level. Feeling (the ego/self) is watch make us experience life and gives life meaning and letting go of these feelings would result in emptiness where life has no meaning which nobody then wants of course. It just would feel like death.
In my defense, your other posts did confirm my intuition. But of course that doesnt excuse the mistake i made in my previous post. My apologies.
I think the closest thing to identity would be identification with “thing that ultimately feels.” I am not saying this is some kind of perfect or ultimate truth, but it is the closest we can get. I use “feeling” in a very broad sense, including awareness under that umbrella.
We have no idea what we ultimately are, but if we really have to be something, it is probably “thing that ultimately feels/is aware.” If you try to introduce something that is aware of “thing that ultimately feels,” you are just shifting the problem, and now you would be the thing that is aware of that—but this does not really make sense.
It is simpler to group feeling and awareness together and say that we are “thing that ultimately feels.” The key word here is “ultimately.”
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